National Home Decarbonisation Group
Warm and comfortable homes Call For Evidence
Deadline for submission: 18th September 2026
Response submitted by: National Home Decarbonisation Group
For more information please contact: support@nhdg.org
About the National Home Decarbonisation Group
The National Home Decarbonisation Group (NHDG) is for Tier 1 contractors delivering large-scale, high-quality home decarbonisation installations in a PAS compliant manner to all tenures of UK housing, directly for the client. NHDG members are involved in large-scale social housing frameworks for energy efficiency measures installation and are closely involved in delivering schemes under the Warm Homes Plan and other projects funded directly by local authorities and housing providers in the UK.
1. Has the Government been focussed on delivering its Warm Homes Plan?
1) Has the Government been focussed on delivering its Warm Homes Plan? 1) Partly. The Government has established a significant programme of investment and has set out an ambitious framework through the Warm Homes Plan (WHP). The NHDG welcomes the scale of funding, the move towards a consolidated cross-tenure scheme for low-income households, the proposed shift towards area-based delivery and the commitment to reform consumer protection. We believe these lay important foundations for delivery, but the Plan has yet to generate the catalytic impact on delivery that was anticipated.
2) Mobilisation remains at an early stage, with activity still centring on programmes that predate the Plan’s publication – namely the Warm Homes: Local Grant (WH:LG), Warm Homes: Social Housing Fund (WH:SHF) and the Boiler Upgrade Scheme. However, the Government intends to combine these two schemes into a single, cross-tenure successor scheme from 2027/28, with WH:SHF continuing to operate in parallel while existing projects complete through to September 2028. The NHDG welcomes this overlap, which is essential to avoid a cliff edge in delivery. However, members require far greater clarity on how the schemes will interact in practice, including eligibility, cost caps, batch approvals and procurement routes.
3) Without this clarity, a disproportionate share of delivery risks being concentrated in the later years of the funding period. That is a material risk, because the constraint is spend rather than time: WH:SHF Wave 3 operates to a fixed annual spend profile, with grant funding required to be spent by 31 March 2028. If mobilisation does not accelerate, the practical consequence is that allocated funding will not be spent within the period, and the households in the worst-performing homes – those the Plan is explicitly intended to reach – will be the ones who miss out. Underspend would also weaken the evidence base for sustained investment at precisely the point at which the case for retrofit needs to be strongest.
4) Based on NHDG members’ experience, the most significant barriers relate to procurement, mobilisation and delivery rather than in the level of funding committed. Members have experienced sustained delays between funding award and mobilisation, driven in part by limited procurement capacity and technical expertise within grant recipients, particularly smaller local authorities and housing associations without a dedicated procurement function. Delivery capability also varies significantly where funding has been devolved: while some areas have mobilised effectively, delivery took around 12 months to begin in the West Midlands Combined Authority region following devolution. These barriers pose as the principal risk to the Plan converting funding into installed measures within the spending period. Addressing them requires practical procurement support and standard templates for grant recipients, minimum quality weightings in publicly funded retrofit procurement and readiness assessments before further funding is devolved.
5) Successful delivery of the Plan should focus on converting the Plan’s commitments into smooth, timely and continuous delivery. Success should be assessed not simply through expenditure or installation volumes, but through sustained support for households and measurable outcomes such as lower energy costs, reduced fuel poverty, improved housing quality, carbon savings, resident health and wellbeing and the lasting performance of installed measures.
2. Where should it be prioritising its efforts to deliver the Plan?
1) The Government’s immediate priority should be to maintain household delivery during the transition to the Warm Homes Low Income Scheme, while giving that scheme enough certainty and preparation time to launch effectively.
2) Existing grant routes have already developed delivery pipelines, procurement arrangements and supply chains, and these are assets that should be carried into the new scheme rather than rebuilt. The additional funding already awarded for WH:SHF Wave 3 has supported continuity, with £1.29 billion allocated for 2025 – 2028 and works able to complete through to 30 September 2028. There is a comparable case for considering further support through the WH:LG, where a decision remains open and where a break in delivery would be most keenly felt in the owner-occupied and private rented sectors. The sector would also benefit from earlier publication of programme start dates and annual funding profiles, particularly for the Warm Homes Fund (WHF), so organisations can plan investment, develop delivery propositions and expand capacity with greater confidence.
3) The sequencing of mobilisation is important to ensuring the new scheme launches smoothly and delivers at scale from the outset. Allowing functioning delivery routes to wind down before the Warm Homes Low Income Scheme is operational would result in lost capability, a pause in assistance for low-income households and a new scheme starting from a weaker base than it needs to. Conversely, keeping proven mechanisms available during the transition would preserve momentum, while leaving the Government sufficient space to consult on and design the successor scheme around credible delivery assumptions. Longer-term institutional reform should continue, but it should be introduced in a way that protects current household support and minimises disruption in delivery. The transition period should be treated as preparation for the new scheme, not simply as a gap to be managed.
4) Consumer protection reform must be a top priority within this. Serious failures of measures installed under ECO4 have eroded public trust in the retrofit sector and exposed clear weaknesses in the current framework, including fragmented oversight, unclear accountability and inconsistent assurance arrangements. The reformed framework is intended to apply from 2028, which is the point at which the Warm Homes Low Income Scheme will be taking on delivery at scale. Getting this right before the transition is essential: the new scheme will be operating across multiple tenures and through an expanding set of devolved delivery bodies and it cannot afford to inherit the accountability gaps that characterised ECO. The Government should therefore ensure that clarity is provided in a timely manner on the Consumer Protection Service’s structure, remit and delivery model, ensure it is genuinely independent of certification bodies and guarantee providers, and recognise the protections already embedded in capital and local authority-led schemes rather than duplicating them.
5) Government should retain established delivery routes until the Warm Homes Low Income Scheme is demonstrably capable of operating at scale, and set out the scheme’s operating rules early enough for grant recipients and supply chains to prepare. This continuity should be combined with local readiness assessments, procurement that rewards quality and proven delivery track record over price alone, an appropriate mix of fabric and low-carbon technologies, flexibility for hard-to-treat homes and sustained investment in skills.
3. Are the Government’s ambitions for the Warm Homes Agency deliverable in time to make a difference to the 2030 clean power mission?
1) The ambition is deliverable only if the Warm Homes Agency is established with a tightly defined remit, sufficient capability and clear transition arrangements. It would also be dependent on a careful phased introduction and not diverting capacity from home upgrades that are already being delivered.
2) The Agency’s contribution to the clean power mission is real but largely indirect. It can reduce household energy demand, enable wider adoption of low-carbon heating, improve the quality and consistency of installations and give consumers a trusted route into the market. These are meaningful contributions to a decarbonised power system, but they are achieved through delivery at scale rather than through institutional reform in itself. The test for the Agency is therefore whether it accelerates installations before 2030, not whether it produces a tidier organisational landscape.
3) On that test, the priority should be a tightly scoped initial remit concentrated on the functions that remove delivery barriers: a single trusted access point for households, consistent national expectations, practical support for Grant Recipients, joined-up data and independent outcome monitoring. Concentrating on these functions first would allow the Agency to demonstrate value early and build credibility with delivery partners. Broader responsibilities can follow once the Agency is established and delivery is running at pace, but taking on too wide a remit at the outset risks adding complexity during an already constrained delivery window.
4) Clear accountability lines will be essential. DESNZ and the Warm Homes Agency should remain the accountable policy owner and intelligent client for the framework, while the Consumer Protection Service should hold operational and adjudicative independence over individual audit, enforcement, complaint and redress decisions, supported by an independent governing board and an ombudsman structurally separate from both the Service and DESNZ. Competence assessment should continue to rest with independent specialist technical bodies.
5) Above all, the Agency should be introduced in phases that protect current delivery. Establishing enduring national capability is the right long-term ambition, but it must not divert capability or attention from the household upgrades already underway, which are what will make the difference before 2030.
4. Should the Agency have a focus on comfortable homes (warm in winter, cool in the summer) rather than simply focussing on heating solutions?
1) Yes
2) The Warm Homes Agency should adopt a broader focus on delivering comfortable, healthy and energy efficient homes, rather than concentrating solely on heating solutions. While access to affordable heating remains important, homes must also be able to respond to increasing risks associated with overheating, poor ventilation and indoor air quality.
3) As set out in our response to Question 3, a tightly scoped initial remit concentrated on the functions that unblock delivery is highly favoured. That is entirely compatible with a broad view of what good outcomes look like: the Agency can frame its objectives around comfortable, healthy homes from the outset while phasing the functions it delivers over time. What matters is that the outcome framework is right from the start, because it will shape scheme design, funding rules and evaluation criteria for years afterwards.
4) A whole-house, fabric-first approach that prioritises insulation, airtightness, ventilation and appropriate shading can improve comfort throughout the year while reducing energy demand and energy costs. Focusing solely on heating technologies risks missing wider building performance issues and may fail to deliver the full benefits that households expect from retrofit investment. As the climate changes and periods of hot weather become more frequent, homes must be designed and retrofitted to remain comfortable and resilient throughout the year. A narrower focus on winter heating alone would not reflect the challenges many households are likely to face over the coming decades.
5) NHDG members have consistently found that successful retrofit projects are those where measures are designed to work together to improve the overall performance of the home. This includes reducing heat loss in winter, limiting overheating in summer, maintaining good indoor air quality and ensuring homes remain affordable to occupy. This reinforces our point made in Question 1: the success of the WHP should be judged through the outcomes achieved for households rather than through installation volumes or expenditure alone.
6) The Agency should therefore promote solutions that support year-round comfort, health, resilience and affordability alongside carbon reduction, and its outcome framework should reflect these objectives from the outset.
5. Is there optimism that the agency will deliver more coherent delivery of energy efficiency and a range of modern heating/cooling solutions in domestic properties?
1) The NHDG is cautiously optimistic that the proposed Warm Homes Agency could help improve coordination across home decarbonisation programmes. A single public body has the potential to provide clearer strategic leadership, simplify the consumer journey and create a more consistent route for households seeking advice and support.
2) The coherence problem NHDG members experience is not principally a shortage of national strategy; it is the practical inconsistency encountered across schemes, tenures and administrative boundaries. Members delivering for housing associations whose stock spans multiple local authority and combined authority areas must navigate different funding regimes, procurement approaches and reporting requirements, which adds administrative complexity and slows delivery. An Agency that sets consistent national expectations and reduces that variation would materially improve coherence. An Agency that sits above the existing landscape without changing how schemes operate on the ground would not, however well-designed its strategy.
3) The devolution context makes this harder rather than easier. Delivery capability varies significantly between areas, and coherence will need to be achieved across an expanding set of devolved bodies rather than imposed centrally. That is a more demanding task than consolidating national functions and it is the principal reason for our caution.
4) Confidence could grow if the Agency’s early priorities were judged against a straightforward test: does a given function reduce the number of different processes a delivery organisation must navigate? Functions that pass this test – consistent national expectations, joined-up data, a single access point for households, practical support for Grant Recipients – should come first. The Agency should also build on delivery models and partnerships that already work well, particularly the contractual and assurance arrangements embedded in capital and local authority-led schemes, rather than layering new requirements over them.
5) The NHDG therefore believes the Agency has the potential to improve coherence and consistency across the sector, but this outcome is not guaranteed.
6. What should the role of the sector be in regulation of the sector and linking consumers with trusted suppliers?
1) The NHDG believes that the sector should play an active role in informing the development of regulation and consumer protection frameworks, while oversight, enforcement and redress functions remain independent. Industry organisations and delivery partners hold practical insight into how standards and assurance frameworks operate in practice. This insight could shape the design of requirements, but it should not extend to adjudicating on compliance, where independence is essential to public confidence.
2) The sector also has an important role in helping consumers identify trusted contractors. This should be underpinned by meaningful entry requirements, ongoing performance monitoring, risk-based auditing, physical inspections and transparent performance information. Consumers should be able to assess whether a contractor has demonstrated competence, compliance and a proven record of delivering high-quality outcomes. Members’ experience is that consumer confidence is strengthened most where households can access clear, impartial information at the point of decision, rather than having to interpret accreditation arrangements themselves.
3) Accountability should also operate in both directions. At present it runs largely one way, with certification bodies overseeing installers but installers having little recourse where a certification body performs poorly, applies requirements inconsistently or carries out inadequate audits. Providing installers with a clear, independent route to raise concerns would improve the quality and consistency of auditing and help ensure that every organisation within the framework is held to a high standard, which ultimately benefits consumers through more consistently compliant work.
4) The Warm Homes Agency should therefore work closely with industry to support effective signposting to trusted providers and to keep standards grounded in delivery realities, while retaining robust independent oversight of compliance and redress.